Abstract. In this article, I propose to push the frontier of Global Value Chain governance analysis through the concept of 'polarity'. Much of the existing GVC literature has focused on 'unipolar' value chains, where one group of 'lead firms' inhabiting a specific function in a chain play a dominant role in governing it. Some scholars have explored the dynamics of governance in GVCs characterized as 'bipolar', where two sets of actors in different functional positions both drive the chain. I expand this direction further to suggest conceptualizing governance within a continuum between unipolarity and multipolarity. Empirically, I do so by examining the evolutionary dynamics of governance in biofuel value chains, with specific focus on the key regulatory and institutional features that facilitated their emergence and expansion. First, I examine the formation, evolution and governance of three national/regional value chains (in Brazil, the US and the EU); then, I provide evidence to support a trend towards the increasing but still partial formation of a global biofuel value chain and examine its governance traits.
Introduction
This article examines the evolutionary dynamics of governance in biofuel value chains, with specific focus on the key regulatory and institutional features that facilitated their emergence and expansion. It aims at providing a historical trajectory of governance, at tracing the national (Brazil, US) and regional (EU) foundations of an increasingly global biofuel value chain, and at highlighting the complexity of constellation of actors engaged in its governance. In doing so, it attempts to partially address three relevant criticism of Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis: (1) that it often provides static accounts of governance; (2) that it does not sufficiently engage with the local, national and regional foundations of global industries; and (3) that by focusing on firm-to-firm relations, it does not properly examine the role that other actors play in GVC governance -such as governments, social movements, labour unions or NGOs.
The experience of the global biofuel value chain examined in this article suggests that industries are not simply established through entrepreneurship, competition and market mechanisms, but are also actively and heavily forged through the actions of governments. Since the 1990s, governments in Brazil, the US and the EU (the main biofuel producing and consuming countries/regions) have been heavily promoting biofuels and enacting 'value chain-forging' policies, often under pressure from industry and agricultural lobbies. These policies were justified in relation to climate change mitigation (especially in the EU), energy security (especially in the US) and farmer support and rural development (in Brazil, but also in the US and EU). The original allure of biofuels from a policy perspective was that they could be framed as 3 being able to address climate change, energy security and rural development at once without fundamentally altering energy consumption practices. Until recently, most kinds of biofuels were seen as attractive also because they can provide 'drop-in' solutions -they can be distributed through existing infrastructure (pipelines, storage facilities, fuel distribution networks) and end-user technology (internal combustion engines).
From the turn of the century to around 2006/07, government interventions enacted policies that effectively forged the various national and, in the case of the EU, regional foundations of an increasingly global biofuel value chain. The EU and US set minimum mandates on the use of biofuels and provided a range of subsidies, research funding and investment facilities to farmers, processors, blenders, biotech companies and universities. Early Brazilian government support of the 1970s and 1980s had waned by the end of the century, but was revitalized in the 2000s. Agricultural lobbies (US corn, German rapeseed farmers), climate change activists seeking non-fossil fuel alternatives, and government departments concerned with energy and security provided a unique combination of interests that pushed biofuel-friendly policies in a generally favourable political environment (Dauvergne and Neville 2009) .
This led to a boost of investments in farming and processing in Brazil, the US and the EU, but also to interest in large-scale investments in land for biofuel productionespecially in Africa but also in South-east Asia. Following decades of neglect in agricultural and rural development, governments saw large-scale investment in land by domestic and international actors as a welcome boost in infrastructure provision and foreign exchange generation (White and Dasgupta 2010) .
But increasing food prices and the related food riots starting in 2006/07 dramatically altered this picture. Civil society groups started holding biofuel production as a major cause of increasing food prices because it takes land and water away from food production -although estimates of the actual impact of biofuel production on total food price increases vary from 3 to 75 per cent (Smith 2010: 5) . Many studies have highlighted deeply problematic aspects of land investments, including shady deals, little benefit for local communities, lack of participation in decision-making at the local level, and environmental degradation (see, among many others, Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Matondi et al. 2011) . Doubts also started to be cast on the impact of biofuel production on GHG emission reductions (Pimentel et al. 2010) . Some feedstock-location combinations have been deemed to be especially problematic in terms of GHG balance or in terms of deforestation (for example, ethanol from corn in the US and biodiesel from palm oil in South-east Asia). A wider methodological debate has been raging on how to take into account crop residues and indirect land use change in the calculation of energy balance sheets and GHG emissions (see Smith 2010).
To these arguments, pro-biofuel analysts responded that marginal land is indeed available for biofuel production and that, with modern farm management and improved technology, it is possible to produce a meaningful proportion of fuels for transport from biological resources without affecting food supply (Cortez et al. 2010 ).
Counter-arguments to these highlighted that land is often not actually 'available' even when labeled as such, that in marginal lands yields are much lower, and that faith in technology is misplaced (Levidow and Paul 2010; Smith 2010) .
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As criticism mounted on biofuels, the EU enacted demands for sustainability standards for the production, trade and use of biofuels in member countries. The US also fine-tuned its subsidies and regulation to increase support for 'next generation' biofuels (those based on improved and new transformation processes of cellulosic material and other waste, and/or on the development of algae feedstocks) relative to first generation biofuels (those based on the processing of feedstock that can also be used for human consumption). And Brazil increased its public relations effort aimed at showing that sugarcane-based ethanol production in the country has indeed a positive impact on GHG emission reductions (Interviews WBMB2, 19, 20, 38 and 40) . (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Matondi et al. 2011) . However, much of the existing work focuses on the technicalities of production and feedstock choice, and on projections of the impacts of biofuels on food security, land use and rural livelihoods in developing countries -rather than on analyzing existing investments. Social science work on the role that standards and sustainability certifications are playing in shaping the biofuel industry has just started to appear (Partzsch 2011; Ponte 2013 ).
Some observers have called this global industry-in-the-making a 'biofuel complex' that is driven by 'a new profitability frontier for agribusiness and energy sectors beset 6 with declining productivity and/or rising costs' (Borras et al. 2010: 576) and justified by 'win-win' narratives. Others refer to it as a 'global assemblage' (Smith 2010) or an 'energy-industrial complex' (McMichael 2009). Mol (2007) and Levidow and Paul (2010) call it a 'global integrated biofuel network' (GIBN). In a recent contribution, Altenburg (2011) used the analytical construct of 'value chain' to examine a regional industry (the cultivation of tree-borne oilseeds for biodiesel production in India) and started examining the material and ideational configurations of this value chain in different Indian states. In this article, I further the analytical project of examining the making, governance and increased globalization of the biofuel industry through the lenses of Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis. What kinds of actors are making important decisions shaping the structure of this value chain and its functional division of labour? Are there one or more groups of actors who drive it (if at all)?
What are the features of this 'driving'?
In the next section, I provide a brief background on biofuels and discuss case study selection and methodology. In the following section, I briefly review the ongoing debates in the Global Value Chain (GVC) governance literature and main criticisms levied to it in view of highlighting the analytical contribution of this article. In the two main sections of the article, first I examine the formation, evolution and governance of three national/regional value chains (in Brazil, the US and the EU); then I provide evidence support a trend towards the increasing but still partial globalization of the biofuel value chain and examine its governance traits. In the concluding section, I
highlight what lessons the biofuel case study teaches us for understanding governance in GVCs. 7 2 Background, case study selection and methodology Biofuels are fuels generated by processing specific kinds of biomass, including agricultural crops, for use in transport, electricity production or for domestic uses (heating, cooking). Ethanol accounts for over 90 per cent of biofuel production globally. It is produced by fermenting and distilling sugars from starchy plants (such as sugarcane, sorghum, wheat and corn) into alcohol. So-called 'next generation' ethanols are under development, which are expected to be produced from cellulose contained in forestry products, crop residues and domestic and industrial waste.
Ethanol can be used in low percentage mixes in regular engines without modification.
Biodiesel is produced from oily crops or trees (such as soya, palm, sunflower and jatropha) and from animal fats and waste cooking oil through the process of transesterification. Some kinds of biodiesel can be used in high-proportion mixes or even unblended in modified diesel engines (see a simplified representation of functions and flows in a generic biofuel value chain in Figure 3 ). Next generation biodiesel production is expected to use inputs from non-fat biomass through thermo-chemical or biochemical conversion of cellulosic material or other crop residues and waste.
In this article, I focus on three systemically important countries/regions in the biofuel industry: Brazil, the US and the EU. In 2011, they accounted for over 87% of total production and for 89% of total consumption of biofuels (see Table 1 ; Figures 1 and   2 ). The US and Brazil account for three-quarters of global production of ethanol (mainly from corn in the US and sugarcane in Brazil), with the US and the EU importing substantial amounts (see Table 2 ). In biodiesel, the EU produces over half in 2011, while Brazil's share decreased from 36% to 23%. It is estimated that 65% of EU vegetable oil, 50% of Brazilian sugarcane and about 40% of US corn are currently used for biofuel production (OECD/FAO, 2012: 88) . Consumption also increased, almost doubling in the US and the EU, and with substantial growth in Brazil followed by a retreat in 2011 (see Table 1 , Figure 3 ). Consumption growth elsewhere has been less marked. Table 2 (14), service providers (7), media (1), NGOs (3), regulatory agencies (5), and researchers (1). Interviewees were offered full confidentiality.
group of products) specific experiences. In the 2000s, a related literature on Global Production Networks (GPNs) also emerged with similar purposes, partly as a response to the perceived limitations of GVC scholarship. The early GVC literature was generally more structuralist and long-range historical in nature, was focused on common features that made a series of activities look like a chain and developed a dual typology of buyer-driven vs producer-driven governance (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi 1999 ). The GPN literature has been from the beginning more concerned with the complexity and messiness of these production networks, has given more weight to production processes and technology development, but has had less interest in governance per se (Henderson et al. 2002; Hess and Yeung 2006) .
In the past few years, however, the two approaches have overlapped considerably and their common features have become increasingly apparent. In both camps, more attention has been drawn to institutional, regulatory and standard-making processes Each literature has kept highlighting its own specificities, but has moderated its critique of the other -to the point that the politics of relative positioning and identity that characterized these literatures in the 2000s is giving way to engaging in actual content and dialogue (Ponte and Sturgeon 2013) .
The idea of governance in global value chains rests on the assumption that, while both disintegration of production and its re-integration through inter-firm trade have recognizable dynamics, they do not occur spontaneously, automatically, or even systematically (Gibbon et al. 2008) . Instead, these processes arise as a result of strategies and decision-making by specific actors, usually large firms that manage access to final markets. In the original approach to governance developed by Gereffi (1994) , governance signals the process of organizing activities with the purpose of achieving a certain functional division of labour along a value chain -resulting in specific allocations of resources and distributions of gains. Here, a group of 'lead firms' drive a value chain through specific mechanisms that are related to the nature of entry barriers and core competences. This involves lead firms defining the terms of chain membership, incorporating/excluding other actors accordingly, generating rents and re-allocating value-adding activities (Gereffi 1994). 2 In this article, I propose to push the frontier of this approach to governance through the analytical lenses of 'polarity'. Much of the existing GVC literature has focused on 'unipolar' value chains -be they buyer-driven or producer-driven (Gereffi 1994 14 In the next section, I apply this approach to the case study of biofuels. Instead of looking at only 'lead firms' as governing actors, I expand the analysis to include other relevant actor groups (such as governments) that actively shape the terms of value chain membership, inclusion and exclusion mechanisms, and value creation, appropriation and (re)distribution along biofuel value chains.
4 National and regional biofuel value chains: Brazil, the US and the EU National (Brazil, US) and regional (EU) biofuel industries have existed for decades and have operated fairly independently from each other, indicating that until recently there was a variety of loosely-coupled biofuel value chains, rather than a global one.
In this section, I examine the formation, evolution and governance of three national/regional value chains as a stepping-stone for understanding the gradual (and still incomplete) establishment of a global biofuel value chain. Given the space limitations, I will provide a more detailed analysis on Brazil, given its longer biofuel history and pioneering government involvement, while offering briefer comparative perspectives in relation to US and EU biofuel value chains.
Brazil
Ethanol production in Brazil is hardly a new activity -it goes back as far as the Following the start of the current financial and economic crisis, greenfield investment has slowed down in ethanol processing in Brazil, and many mills facing financial woes have been bought up by major existing players (Cosan) and relatively new and increasingly important ones (Petrobras, Bunge, Noble Group) (IWBMB4 and 6). New uses for ethanol are also being developed -especially for the production of stationary electricity and bioplastics, adding complexity to its features (various WBMB presentations). Expectations in the industry are of further consolidation. As stated by one industry player 'in the near future, four-five large players with capacity of crushing 100 or more million tons of cane per year will be leading the industry' (IWBMB5). Table 3 
The United States and the European Union
Biorefineries that process corn into ethanol have been operational for decades in the US. Originally, most of these were local, part of farmer cooperatives and with limited corporate involvement. By and large, before the 2000s, the biofuel value chain in the US was a loose assemblage of localized value chains, as the industry was fragmented and only weakly integrated (IWBMB1). In these conditions, there was little explicit governance of the value chain. In the 2000s, however, rising oil prices and political instability in the oil-rich Middle East facilitated the emergence of a policy discourse in the US that made biofuel production more attractive (Gillon 2010; Lehrer 2010) . Biofuel producers have been operating for decades in selected EU countries as well.
But it was only in the 2000s that a large boost was provided to the industry when individual governments within the EU first started adopting mandatory targets for use of biofuels in transport. Governments and later on the EU Commission became more open to policy influence from farm interests (especially from rapeseed and sugar beet producers) and corporate lobbyists (IWBM11 and 17; see also Franco et al. 2010) .
They also started promoting biofuel investments in Africa and South-east Asia via technical assistance, energy supply deals and the facilitation of land acquisitions (IBICA1, 2 and 9). At the EU level, the European Biofuel Technology Platform (EBPTF) which steering committee is packed with actors from farm, oil, auto, biotech, biofuel and forestry products industries, has been very active in shaping policy (Franco et al. 2010 ).
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The most important output of the EU policy process was the establishment of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (RED), requiring 20 per cent of energy use in the EU and 10 per cent of transport fuels to come from renewable sources by 2020.
Because there is not enough land available in the EU to produce the first generation biofuel feedstocks necessary for this target, the original EU directive was in effect stimulating two parallel processes: the outsourcing of biofuel production outside the EU; and a speeding up of development, commercialization and scaling-up of 'next generation' biofuel technologies.
Partly in response to mounting environmental criticism of biofuel production, in June 2010 the Commission adopted a scheme for certifying sustainable biofuels. In order to receive government support or count towards mandatory national renewable energy targets, biofuels used in the EU (whether locally produced or imported) have to comply with sustainability criteria including: land use (no conversion of land with high carbon stock or land with high biodiversity value); a minimum reduction of GHG emissions over the whole production chain (35 per cent less than gasoline); 3 and a system monitoring the whole value chain from feedstock to the pump (PISCC62, 63, 65). The Commission decided to set up an accreditation system for voluntary certification schemes that meet its criteria. This has led to a veritable scramble in the market for sustainability certifications. In July 2011, the EU recognized a first batch of seven certifications, followed by six more certifications in the second half of 2012 (see details in Ponte 2013).
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In this section, I have shown that the biofuel value chain in Brazil evolved, since the 1970s, from a government-driven unipolar chain to a multipolar chain where government action is still influential, but where major agro-industrial groups, ethanol producers, agro-chemical and bio-tech companies jostle to govern it. I have also highlighted that national/regional biofuel value chains emerged in the US and the EU, but mostly in the 2000s. They were first characterized by unipolar governance structures, led by government, but are now also developing into multipolar value chains. A common trend in the US and the EU is the emerging powerful role of the biotech industry at the expense of the traditional farming lobby. In the next section, first I provide evidence to support a trend towards the increasing but still partial globalization of the biofuel value chain. Then, I examine its governance traits.
The emergence of an increasingly global biofuel value chain and its governance
The biofuel value chain is becoming increasingly global through a variety of processes of internationalization, cross-regionalization and a few properly 'global' dynamics. Although a precise measurement of 'globalization' is not possible in succinct quantitative terms, a combination of three elements clearly signals a trend in that direction: (1) increased trade flows and broader geographic dispersion of feedstock production; (2) new international and cross-regional processes taking place mostly through government-led or -facilitated initiatives; and (3) increasing consolidation among industry actors, the rise of international operations and alliances, and the increased and sometimes completely new involvement of global players from the agro-food, fuels and agro-processing industries in biofuels.
First, as examined in an earlier section of this article, substantial trade flows in biofuels that were not present in the early 2000s not only have emerged (see Table 2 Much biofuel consumption and production is still concentrated in the Brazil, the US and the EU. International trade flows as proportion of total production are smaller than those of other major agro-food commodities, especially for ethanol. And biofuel industries are still to an important extent governed by national and regional regulatory and policy processes.
As we have seen in the previous section, national and regional biofuel value chains in Brazil, the US and the EU, until the mid-2000s were characterized by unipolar, and mostly government-driven, governance through minimum mandates, tariff protection, investment incentives and subsidy provision to farmers and processors. This is not necessarily a feature of national and regional value chains per se (vis a vis global value chains), but rather an empirical observation. Figure 3 shows that these value chains were unipolar (polarity is represented by the number of ovals) and that the main 'driver' was government (the oval encompasses the whole value chain as government shapes most if not all its constituent elements). In this configuration, industry actors exert influence mainly through lobbying government, rather than impacting on other value chain actors directly. A more traditional kind of GVC governance analysis would have focused on identifying one (or two) groups of 'lead firms' located at one or more functional positions in the value chain, while the role of government would have been relegated to the institutional framework surrounding the value chain.
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In contrast, the nascent global biofuel value chain can be characterized in and engine manufacturers, auto manufacturers). 7 It is the interplay of this complex constellation of actors that will determine the future shape of the biofuel industry and related (re)distributional effects.
Conclusion
The case study of biofuels provides three main insights for furthering the understanding of governance in global value chains. First, it suggests that examining the evolutionary paths of value chain governance is essential. This involves tracing changing structures and configurations (and policy discourses underpinning them) in time, but also analyzing the national and regional bases upon which global industries are built. The case study of biofuels shows how government intervention and support led to clear processes of consolidation in national and regional biofuel value chains that ultimately provided a springboard for the internationalization and crossregionalization of investment and the engagement of truly global players in the industry. Examining how national and regional dynamics are extended to forge global value chains is thus essential in understanding their governance.
Second, the biofuel case study suggests that a focus on 'lead firms' in GVC governance is not sufficient. Without government mandates, subsidies and bankrolling of research, this industry would not exist. Without regulation demanding 'sustainability', the market for certified biofuels would have been much smaller or even non-existent. At least in their formative phase, biofuel value chains were 'government-driven' in the sense that regulatory choices directly shaped their structure and functional division of labour. Granted, a variety of lobbies were behind the policy processes that led to regulation, but these can not be ascribed to one segment of the industry alone. As the biofuel value chain becomes more global, a new set of key global drivers is emerging, including direct value chain actors such as providers of inputs and technology, producers and international traders, oil majors and distribution companies, and providers of end-use technology, but also indirect players such as sustainability standards makers and certifiers, social movements and international NGOs.
Third, much of the GVC literature has so far focused on 'unipolar' value chainschains that are driven by one set of actors carrying out a specific function or a group of functions along a value chain (e.g. buyer-driven, producer-driven chains). Some scholars have ventured into the analysis of 'bipolar' chains, where two groups of actors jostle to get the upper hand in governing. I argue that it is helpful to expand this direction further to examine governance in relation to a continuum between unipolarity and multipolarity. Multipolar chains are not just 'markets' (non-governed, as neoclassical economics would have it), but are shaped by explicit strategic actions, by various kinds and degrees of coordination and exhibit multiple foci of power.
From this perspective, the global biofuel value chain is becoming multipolar and driven by several groups of lead firms in complex interaction with governments, standard makers and international NGOs. These actors are currently competing over creating or allocating new value, extracting value from others and re-defining the functional division of labour along the chain. It is still early to assess whether the global biofuel value chain will develop a unipolar (or bipolar) governance structure with 'lead firms' playing a predominant role (as is the case in many other industries).
But examining the evolutionary dynamics of governance along these axes should be part of future research in this industry and in others.
